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ABSTRACT	  The	  trope	  of	  the	  African	  “tribe”	  is	  often	  invoked	  as	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  explanation	  for	  ethnicized	  political	  conflict	  across	  the	  continent.	  This	  argument	  places	  both	  too	  much	  and	  too	  little	  emphasis	  on	  ethnicity.	  It	  neglects	  the	  structural	  considerations	  that	  grant	  ethnicity	  its	  salience,	  whilst	  placing	  too	  little	  emphasis	  on	  the	  flexibility	  of	  ethnicity	  as	  a	  social	  construct	  and	  its	  differing	  usage	  in	  political	  structures	  across	  the	  continent.	  Instead,	  this	  paper	  begins	  with	  the	  presumption	  that	  ethnicity	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  it	  becomes	  significant.	  It	  examines	  the	  colonial	  (mis)management	  of	  ‘tribe’,	  and	  proceeds	  to	  investigate	  several	  structural	  causes	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  instrumentalization	  of	  ethnicity.	  These	  causes	  include	  the	  use	  of	  ethnicity	  as	  a	  political	  currency;	  the	  interaction	  of	  ethnicity	  with	  patron-­‐client	  state	  structures;	  ethnicized	  political	  mobilization	  as	  a	  response	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  institutionalism;	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Cold-­‐War	  and	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  international	  contexts.	  In	  examining	  these	  structural	  causes	  of	  ethnicized	  political	  conflict,	  this	  paper	  hopes	  to	  reshape	  the	  discourse	  around	  African	  political	  conflicts	  away	  from	  a	  presumed	  irrationality	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  intersecting	  factors	  that	  create	  and	  exacerbate	  ethnicized	  armed	  conflict	  in	  post-­‐colonial	  Africa.	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What	  is	  the	  trouble	  with	  ‘tribe’?	  Considering	  the	  grasp	  that	  ethnicized	  politics	  seems	  to	  have	  on	  electoral	  contests	  and	  civil	  conflicts	  across	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  a	  characterization	  that	  directly	  correlates	  cause	  (‘tribe’)	  and	  effect	  (conflict)	  can	  be	  tempting.	  However,	  a	  closer	  analysis	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘tribe’,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  conflicts	  and	  electoral	  contests	  that	  it	  is	  thought	  to	  unduly	  influence,	  uncovers	  layers	  of	  nuance	  that	  expose	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  this	  well-­‐worn	  trope.	  This	  paper	  will	  contest	  the	  notion	  that	  ethnic	  conflict	  and	  ‘tribalism’	  are	  exclusively	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  civil	  conflicts	  and	  electoral	  contests	  in	  Africa	  by	  rebutting	  the	  primordialist	  conception	  of	  ethnicity	  and	  exploring	  the	  colonial	  origins	  of	  the	  ‘tribe’	  as	  a	  social	  cleavage.	  This	  paper	  will	  then	  explore	  the	  interaction	  of	  ethnicity	  with	  a	  myriad	  of	  other	  factors	  that,	  in	  combination,	  foment	  ethnic	  political	  conflict.	  It	  will	  do	  this	  by	  exploring	  three	  levels	  of	  analysis:	  individual,	  national,	  and	  international.	  At	  the	  individual	  level,	  this	  paper	  will	  recognize	  the	  role	  of	  neo-­‐patrimonialism	  and	  the	  use	  of	  ethnicity	  as	  a	  political	  currency	  by	  African	  elites.	  At	  the	  national	  level,	  this	  paper	  will	  recognize	  state	  weakness	  and	  the	  instrumental	  use	  of	  ethnic	  solidarity	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  political	  movements.	  At	  the	  international	  level,	  this	  paper	  will	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  external	  actors,	  Cold	  War	  and	  post-­‐independence	  realities,	  as	  well	  as	  international	  monetary	  policy	  in	  creating	  and	  exacerbating	  ethnic	  conflicts.	  	   The	  “Tribe”:	  Contemporary	  Discourse	  and	  its	  Colonial	  Precedent	  The	  definition	  of	  ‘tribe’	  is	  itself	  notoriously	  slippery,	  rife	  with	  complications	  borne	  from	  a	  troubled	  history.	  The	  common	  conception	  of	  the	  African	  ‘tribe’	  evokes	  images	  of	  a	  society	  defined	  by	  kinship	  and	  regional	  ties,	  often	  at	  odds	  with	  other	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tribes	  in	  the	  region.	  However,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  concept	  significantly	  differs	  from	  other	  ethnic	  social	  configurations	  has	  only	  recently	  become	  the	  subject	  of	  scholarly	  attention.1	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  was	  indeed	  significant	  pre-­‐colonial	  ethnic	  differentiation,	  but	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  distinctions	  matched	  the	  common	  conception	  of	  tribe	  and	  tribalism	  is	  a	  topic	  of	  heated	  controversy.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  although	  the	  veracity	  of	  ‘tribe’	  is	  a	  source	  of	  considerable	  historiographical	  debate,	  the	  conception	  of	  ‘tribe’	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  served	  an	  important	  functional	  construct	  to	  European	  colonizers.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  regardless	  of	  how	  ahistorical	  the	  concept	  may	  be,	  it	  was	  a	  useful	  concept	  in	  the	  construction	  and	  maintenance	  of	  colonial	  power.	  Colonial	  social	  anthropologists	  were	  granted	  the	  power	  to	  define	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  ‘natural’	  African	  society,	  and	  they	  used	  this	  power	  to	  legitimize	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  conquering	  powers.2	  This	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  basic	  academic	  inquiry	  with	  which	  they	  undertook	  this	  project.	  Even	  in	  defining	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ‘tribe’	  as	  the	  bedrock	  of	  African	  society,	  the	  colonial	  social	  anthropologists	  “saw	  no	  need	  to	  trace	  its	  sociological	  origins	  in	  other	  institutions	  or	  in	  previous	  historical	  epochs,	  nor	  to	  account	  for	  its	  persistence	  in	  the	  African	  historical	  landscape.”3	  It	  did	  not	  matter,	  then,	  that	  the	  reality	  of	  African	  social	  structures	  did	  not	  reflect	  their	  colonial	  definitions-­‐	  they	  were	  defined	  by	  colonialists	  in	  a	  way	  that	  necessitated	  the	  intervention	  of	  European	  powers.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Peter Ekeh, "Social Anthropology and Two Contrasting Uses of Tribalism in Africa," Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 4 (1990): 662 
2 Ibid., 672 
3 Ibid., 673	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  The	  conception	  was	  historically	  configured	  as	  a	  dichotomy:	  the	  stagnant,	  uncivilized	  African	  ‘tribe’	  was	  contrasted	  against	  the	  dynamic,	  modern	  European	  ‘nation’	  and	  was	  found	  to	  be	  wanting.4	  Through	  this	  paradigm,	  the	  African	  tribe	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  residue	  from	  some	  pre-­‐modern	  epoch,	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  of	  the	  barbarity	  and	  irrationality	  of	  African	  peoples.	  As	  tribalism	  was	  Africa’s	  ‘natural’	  condition,	  it	  extended	  backward	  and	  forward	  into	  the	  expanse	  of	  time,	  seemingly	  in	  perpetuity.	  	  The	  construction	  of	  this	  dichotomy	  had	  several	  important	  functional	  consequences.	  For	  one,	  by	  presuming	  the	  inferiority	  of	  African	  socio-­‐political	  structures,	  it	  provided	  a	  direct	  impetus	  for	  the	  civilizing	  mission	  and	  the	  white	  man’s	  burden.	  More	  significant	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper,	  however,	  is	  that	  this	  dichotomy	  created	  a	  concrete	  classification	  system	  through	  which	  the	  colonizers	  could	  rule.	  It	  rigidified	  fluid	  social	  structures	  and	  introduced	  the	  element	  of	  bureaucracy.	  Consider	  the	  case	  of	  Rwanda,	  where	  the	  concepts	  ‘Tutsi’	  and	  ‘Hutu’	  were	  in	  reality	  positions	  of	  status,	  not	  tribal	  affiliation,	  prior	  to	  the	  advent	  of	  colonialism.5	  With	  the	  introduction	  of	  colonial	  bureaucracies,	  identification	  cards	  and	  censuses	  served	  to	  stagnate	  social	  movement	  between	  the	  groups.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Rwanda,	  as	  in	  other	  post-­‐colonial	  African	  states,	  ‘tribe’	  and	  ethnic	  identity	  were	  made	  essential	  to	  the	  African	  body	  politic	  through	  the	  process	  of	  colonization.	   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Einar Braathen, “Ethnicity Kills? Social Struggles for Power, Resources and Identities inn the Neo-
Patrimonial State,” In Ethnicity Kills? The Politics of War, Peace, and Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, ed. Einar Braathen et al. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 4 
5 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2001), 23 
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The	  European	  passion	  for	  classification	  also	  served	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  colonial	  system	  in	  another	  way.	  It	  served	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  divide	  and	  rule,	  elevating	  some	  ‘tribes’	  as	  closer	  to	  Europeans	  and	  marginalizing	  others	  from	  systems	  of	  power.	  As	  Mahmood	  Mamdani	  argues,	  these	  systems	  were	  necessary	  to	  facilitate	  indirect	  colonial	  governance.6	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  he	  argues	  that	  “[t]ribalism	  then	  was	  the	  very	  form	  that	  colonial	  rule	  took	  within	  the	  local	  state.”7	  This	  action	  was	  undertaken	  for	  two	  important	  reasons:	  it	  prevented	  solidarity	  between	  colonized	  groups;	  as	  well	  as	  giving	  the	  colonizing	  power	  a	  lessened	  load	  from	  the	  internal	  governance	  of	  the	  colony.	  However,	  the	  systematic	  marginalization	  of	  particular	  communities	  and	  the	  social	  inequalities	  that	  resulted	  had	  important	  ramifications	  for	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  African	  landscape.	  Returning	  the	  example	  of	  Rwanda,	  the	  Belgian	  colonizers	  privileged	  the	  Tutsi	  community	  over	  the	  Hutu,	  going	  so	  far	  as	  to	  require	  all	  non-­‐Tutsi	  to	  invest	  forced	  labor	  into	  constructing	  the	  colonial	  infrastructure.8	  As	  this	  paper	  will	  later	  show,	  many	  of	  the	  advantages	  endowed	  to	  certain	  ‘tribes’	  by	  the	  colonizers	  continued	  into	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  political	  landscape.	  In	  fact,	  by	  the	  middle	  of	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  disproportionate	  accumulation	  of	  wealth	  by	  Tutsi	  had	  led	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  ‘Bahutu	  Manifesto’	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1996), 8 
7 Ibid., 183 
8 David Norman Smith, "The Psychocultural Roots of Genocide: Legitimacy and Crisis in Rwanda," 
American Psychologist 53 (1998): 743 
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1957,	  which	  called	  for	  the	  double	  emancipation	  –	  both	  from	  Belgian	  colonizers	  and	  Tutsi	  oppressors.9	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  colonial	  legacy	  has	  been	  definitional	  to	  the	  African	  experience	  of	  tribe	  and	  ethnicity.	  Indeed,	  the	  arbitrary	  borders	  that	  enclose	  many	  unrelated	  communities	  and	  separate	  contingent	  communities	  is	  a	  residue	  of	  colonialism.	  However,	  this	  paper	  will	  contend	  that	  many	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  contemporary	  discourse	  (mis)understands	  the	  role	  of	  ‘tribe’	  in	  African	  politics	  is	  also	  itself	  partly	  a	  residue	  of	  the	  colonial	  past.	  The	  argument	  that	  ethnicity	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  individual;	  that	  it	  is	  an	  immutable	  fact	  of	  history,	  region	  and	  society;	  is	  known	  as	  primordialism.10	  This	  seemingly	  benign	  argument,	  however,	  carries	  with	  it	  the	  legacy	  of	  colonialism.	  To	  argue	  that	  tribalism	  is	  Africa’s	  ‘natural’	  condition	  of	  the	  African	  political	  system	  is	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  dynamism	  and	  fluidity	  of	  identity.	  In	  reality,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  given	  that	  ethnicity	  is	  automatically	  more	  important	  to	  an	  individual	  than	  other	  social	  cleavages,	  such	  as	  religion	  or	  region.	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  primacy	  that	  such	  an	  argument	  places	  upon	  ethnicity	  and	  tribe	  distracts	  from	  the	  structural	  causes	  for	  conflict,	  it	  echoes	  the	  claims	  of	  irrationality	  that	  colonizers	  used	  to	  legitimize	  their	  rule.	  As	  Ngūgï	  wa	  Thiong’o	  argues,	  assumed	  ‘traditional’	  hostility	  was	  deemed	  sufficient	  to	  explain	  the	  reasons	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid. 
10 S. Wanjala Nasong’o, “Resources Allocation and the Crisis of Political Conflicts in Africa: Beyond the 
Inter-Ethnic Hatred Thesis,” in Conflict in Contemporary Africa, ed. P. G. Okoth et al. (Nairobi: 
Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2000), 45 	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that	  the	  Kikuyu	  were	  the	  victims	  of	  2007	  post-­‐election	  violence	  in	  Kenya.11	  The	  explanation	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  “traditional	  enmity	  between	  Tribe	  X	  and	  Tribe	  Y”	  was	  considered	  sufficient.12	  However,	  as	  Einar	  Braathen	  argues	  “the	  significance	  of	  ethnicity	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  it	  suddenly	  becomes	  salient”.13	  ‘Tribe’,	  then,	  may	  
seem	  to	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  an	  electoral	  contest	  or	  civil	  conflict,	  but	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  conflict	  cannot	  be	  understood	  without	  analysis	  of	  the	  undergirding	  structural	  factors	  to	  which	  it	  responds.	  Ethnicity,	  then,	  is	  certainly	  an	  important	  element	  of	  the	  African	  political	  landscape	  but	  its	  significance	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  when	  taken	  in	  context	  with	  other	  traversing	  factors	  that	  also	  impact	  upon	  the	  political	  discourse.	  This	  paper	  will	  now	  explore	  the	  first	  of	  these	  traversing	  factors	  –	  the	  use	  of	  ethnicity	  as	  political	  currency	  by	  governing	  elites	  across	  the	  continent.	  	  	  	  	   Big	  Men,	  Personal	  Rule	  and	  the	  Ethnicized	  State	  The	  use	  of	  tribe	  and	  ethnicity	  as	  a	  political	  currency	  is	  not	  a	  new	  phenomenon,	  and	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  unique	  to	  Africa.	  However,	  the	  interaction	  of	  tribe	  and	  ethnicity	  with	  the	  politics	  of	  personal	  rule	  can	  contribute	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  systemic	  factors	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  conflagration	  of	  ethnic	  violence	  and	  electoral	  contests.	  This	  paper	  will	  show	  that	  this	  interplay	  operates	  in	  three	  ways:	  first,	  the	  politics	  of	  personal	  rule	  means	  that	  political	  leaders	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ngugi wa Thiong’o,"The Myth of Tribe in African Politics." Transition 1 (2009): 18 
12 Ibid. 
13 Einar Braathen, “Ethnicity Kills? Social Struggles for Power, Resources and Identities inn the Neo-
Patrimonial State”, 4	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allocate	  resources	  disproportionately	  to	  certain	  ethnic	  communities;	  second,	  those	  leaders	  that	  feel	  threatened	  in	  the	  security	  of	  their	  power	  can	  use	  a	  call	  to	  ethnicity	  to	  garner	  support	  and	  court	  potential	  clients;	  and	  third,	  the	  unpredictable	  way	  in	  which	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  states	  allocate	  resources	  results	  in	  a	  winner-­‐take-­‐all	  governing	  philosophy	  that	  heightens	  competition	  for	  political	  power.	  	   In	  a	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  political	  structure,	  political	  elites	  use	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  state	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  loyalty	  and	  support	  from	  other	  actors.14	  By	  using	  public	  coffers	  to	  finance	  personal	  support,	  elites	  fuse	  public	  and	  private	  interests	  and	  create	  clients	  that	  are	  faithful	  to	  the	  individual	  ruler,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  political	  objectives	  that	  the	  ruler	  espouses	  to	  the	  public.	  As	  the	  power	  flows	  not	  from	  the	  office,	  but	  from	  the	  individual	  leader,	  this	  form	  of	  governance	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  ‘personal	  rule’.	  The	  impersonal	  structures	  of	  the	  political	  system	  are	  often	  integrated	  into,	  or	  run	  alongside,	  the	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  system.	  This	  form	  of	  governance	  has	  been	  considered	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  some	  regimes,	  as	  it	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  pressure	  valve	  to	  invite	  political	  dissidents	  into	  the	  regime.15	  However,	  as	  this	  paper	  will	  now	  show,	  when	  the	  politics	  of	  personal	  rule	  are	  ethnicized,	  it	  can	  exacerbate	  political	  conflict	  and	  electoral	  contests.	  	  While	  the	  simple	  fact	  of	  ethnic	  heterogeneity	  or	  tribal	  affiliation	  may	  not	  
itself	  create	  violence	  or	  electoral	  conflict,	  when	  it	  is	  combined	  with	  the	  politics	  of	  resource	  distribution	  it	  can	  become	  a	  flash	  point	  that	  engulfs	  in	  conflicts	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid., 11 
15 Leonardo Arriola, "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa," Comparative Political Studies 42 (2009): 
1340	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electoral	  contests.	  A	  president	  in	  a	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  system	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  skew	  the	  allocation	  of	  resources	  in	  order	  to	  create	  or	  maintain	  patron-­‐client	  relationships.	  This	  can	  occur,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Kenya,	  “in	  total	  disregard	  of	  merit	  and	  qualifications”.16	  As	  Mulinge	  and	  Munyae	  argue,	  the	  state	  can	  be	  ‘ethnicized’	  in	  regard	  to	  resource	  allocation	  in	  two	  ways:	  first,	  the	  favoring	  of	  a	  certain	  group	  by	  a	  personal	  ruler	  creates	  a	  sentiment	  of	  legitimate	  ownership	  amongst	  the	  group	  and	  entrenches	  their	  commitment	  to	  defend	  their	  newly	  won	  prized	  position;	  second,	  once	  the	  higher	  echelons	  of	  a	  certain	  organization	  are	  sufficiently	  ethnicized,	  it	  opens	  opportunities	  for	  the	  lower	  stratums	  of	  the	  organization	  to	  also	  be	  allotted	  to	  a	  particular	  ethnic	  group.17	  This	  can	  result	  in	  the	  near-­‐total	  control	  of	  a	  certain	  ethnic	  group	  in	  positions	  of	  power.	  	  A	  call	  to	  ethnicity	  is	  a	  powerful	  force;	  it	  at	  once	  grants	  salience	  to	  ethnic	  divisions	  and	  creates	  ready-­‐made	  supporters,	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  a	  distraction	  from	  the	  issues	  that	  may	  arise	  from	  legitimate	  criticism	  of	  modes	  of	  governance.	  As	  Richard	  Ilorah	  argues,	  “The	  leaders	  manipulate	  members	  of	  their	  ethnic	  group	  into	  believing	  that	  reforms	  are	  threats	  to	  both	  their	  political	  and	  economic	  power	  bases,	  and	  that	  …	  reforms	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  reverse	  than	  increase	  prosperity.”18	  The	  mobilization	  of	  ethnic	  identities	  by	  political	  leaders	  serves	  to	  rigidify	  the	  divides	  between	  ethnicities,	  providing	  a	  platform	  for	  scapegoating	  and	  the	  further	  economic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Mulinge Munyae and Margaret Munyae, "The Ethnicization of the State and the Crises of African 
Development: The Kenyan Experience," Journal of Cultural Studies 2 (2000): 145 
17 Ibid. 
18 Richard Ilorah, "Ethnic Bias, Favouritism and Development in Africa," Development Southern Africa 26 
(2009): 696	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marginalization	  of	  political	  dissidents	  from	  other	  ethnic	  communities.19	  When	  President	  Moi	  of	  Kenya	  faced	  the	  political	  challenge	  of	  the	  newly	  minted	  multi-­‐party	  elections	  in	  1992,	  he	  mobilized	  his	  fellow	  Kalenjin	  through	  a	  call	  to	  ethnicity,	  reminding	  them	  that	  the	  privileged	  status	  that	  they	  were	  afforded	  by	  his	  presence	  as	  leader	  was	  at	  risk.20	  Thus,	  the	  monocausal	  explanations	  for	  the	  1992	  pre-­‐election	  violence	  in	  Kenya	  that	  posited	  an	  innate	  ethnic	  enmity	  between	  the	  Kalenjin	  and	  Kikuyu	  are	  incomplete,	  at	  best.	  	  As	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  president	  in	  a	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  system	  to	  distribute	  resources	  is	  nearly	  unrivaled,	  the	  competition	  for	  political	  office	  becomes	  correspondingly	  more	  fierce.	  Thus,	  the	  pattern	  of	  patron-­‐client	  relationships	  results	  in	  a	  winner-­‐take-­‐all	  philosophy,	  where	  all	  politically	  significant	  ethnic	  populations	  of	  the	  nation	  want	  a	  chance	  to	  ‘eat	  the	  national	  cake’.21	  As	  Adebayo	  Adedechi	  explains	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  winner-­‐takes-­‐all	  philosophy	  compounds	  the	  issues	  of	  the	  issues	  of	  resource	  allocation	  and	  the	  call	  to	  ethnicity,	  in	  a	  passage	  that	  is	  well	  worth	  quoting	  at	  length.	  In	  these	  nations,	  political	  power	  is	  sought	  in	  order,	  inter	  alia,	  to	  acquire	  control	  over	  the	  means	  of	  production.	  Those	  who	  win	  in	  the	  intense	  and	  brutal	  political	  power	  competition	  no	  longer	  need	  to	  exert	  themselves	  in	  furthering	  their	  economic	  well-­‐being.	  Those	  who	  lose	  are	  not	  just	  immeserated	  and	  pauperized	  but	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  losing	  their	  lives	  because	  African	  economies	  are	  usually	  state-­‐dominated.	  Because	  it	  is	  the	  state	  that	  sets	  the	  terms	  of	  competition	  between	  groups,	  the	  pursuit	  of	  particularistic	  objectives	  often	  becomes	  embodied	  as	  a	  national	  goal.	  This	  results	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Matthias Basedau and Henryk Pierskalla Jan. "How Ethnicity Conditions the Effect of Oil and Gas on 
Civil Conflict: A Spatial Analysis of Africa from 1990 to 2010," Political Geography 38 (2014): 9 
20 Nasong’o, “Resources Allocation and the Crisis of Political Conflicts in Africa”, 52 
21 Ibid.	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overpoliticization	  of	  social	  public	  goods,	  which	  significantly	  weakens	  the	  state	  itself,	  and	  in	  the	  ethnicization	  of	  the	  competition.22	  	  This	  clearly	  provides	  an	  impetus	  for	  mobilization	  along	  the	  same	  ethnic	  and	  tribal	  lines	  under	  which	  certain	  ethnic	  communities	  were	  relegated	  from	  the	  means	  of	  production.	  The	  interesting	  paradox	  remains	  that	  if	  a	  marginalized	  community	  were	  to	  mobilize	  against	  the	  ruling	  elite	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  conditions,	  it	  would	  be	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  exact	  same	  reasons	  that	  make	  adopting	  the	  role	  of	  power	  so	  enticing.	  It	  bears	  reminding,	  then,	  some	  perceived	  longstanding	  inter-­‐ethnic	  hatred	  would	  be	  woefully	  insufficient	  to	  explain	  the	  eruption	  of	  political	  violence	  or	  electoral	  contests.	  As	  this	  paper	  will	  now	  show,	  the	  actions	  of	  these	  political	  leaders	  in	  creating	  the	  patron-­‐client	  relationships,	  disproportionately	  allocating	  resources,	  using	  a	  call	  to	  ethnicity	  to	  garner	  political	  support,	  and	  fostering	  a	  winner-­‐take-­‐all	  spirit	  of	  governance	  has	  serious	  consequences	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  African	  state,	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  tribe	  and	  ethnicity.	   	  State	  Weakness	  and	  Ethnic	  Solidarity	  	   The	  consequences	  of	  the	  personal	  rule	  paradigm	  for	  the	  structural	  relationship	  of	  the	  state	  to	  ethnic	  and	  tribal	  communities	  is	  important	  in	  understanding	  electoral	  contests	  and	  political	  violence.	  While	  those	  who	  subscribe	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Adebayo Adedeji, Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace 
and Good Governance (London: Zed Books, 1999) 12 	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to	  a	  primodialist	  inter-­‐ethnic	  hatred	  thesis	  may	  point	  to	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  heterogeneity	  as	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  conflict,	  this	  paper	  will	  show	  that	  changes	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  African	  state	  contribute	  to	  the	  eruption	  of	  political	  violence	  and	  contested	  elections.	  This	  paper	  will	  show	  that	  state-­‐level	  structural	  conditions	  can	  result	  in	  ethnic	  conflicts	  in	  three	  ways:	  first,	  through	  the	  lack	  of	  effective	  political	  institutionalization,	  second,	  by	  creating	  a	  ‘minority	  at	  risk’	  syndrome	  which	  results	  in	  the	  mobilization	  of	  tribe	  and	  ethnicity;	  and	  third,	  through	  the	  retreat	  of	  the	  state.	  	  	   The	  lack	  of	  effective	  political	  institutionalization	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  personal	  rule,	  as	  the	  fusion	  of	  the	  public	  and	  private	  interests	  make	  a	  difficult	  prospect	  of	  creating	  “effective	  political	  organizations	  and	  procedures	  which	  promote	  harmony	  among	  social	  groups	  and	  regulate	  their	  behavior	  as	  they	  engage	  in	  competition	  for	  the	  ever	  scarce	  societal	  resources.”23	  Nasong’o	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  mere	  existence	  of	  disparate	  ethnic	  groups	  in	  a	  single	  political	  space	  that	  causes	  conflict,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  political	  competition	  occurs	  in	  a	  context	  that	  lacks	  political	  institutionalism.24	  The	  lack	  of	  effective	  means	  of	  political	  change,	  combined	  with	  the	  winner-­‐take-­‐all	  governing	  philosophy	  mobilizes	  communities	  that	  are	  systematically	  marginalized	  from	  the	  levers	  of	  power.25	  The	  mobilization	  of	  the	  marginalized	  Acholi	  ethnic	  group	  in	  northern	  Uganda	  follows	  this	  pattern,	  as	  no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Nasong’o, “Resources Allocation and the Crisis of Political Conflicts in Africa”, 46 
24 Ibid., 44 
25 Nelson Kasfir, "Explaining Ethnic Political Participation." World Politics 31 (1979): 372	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effective	  pressure	  valve	  existed	  to	  diffuse	  the	  conflict	  that	  pitted	  the	  Lord’s	  Resistance	  Army	  against	  the	  Ugandan	  government	  from	  1986	  to	  present.26	  	  	   The	  ‘minority	  at	  risk’	  syndrome	  is	  a	  dynamic	  that	  occurs	  when	  there	  is	  “a	  general	  feeling	  among	  disadvantaged	  groups	  that	  the	  advantaged	  group	  has	  taken	  over	  the	  country”.27	  It	  is	  related	  to	  political	  institutionalism,	  as	  the	  state	  cannot	  provide	  the	  necessary	  guarantees	  to	  effectively	  integrate	  the	  minority	  group	  into	  the	  political	  system.	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  1992	  pre-­‐election	  violence	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  Rift	  Valley	  of	  Kenya.	  Kikuyu	  dominance	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  resources	  in	  Kenya	  during	  the	  Kenyatta	  years	  (1963-­‐1978)	  led	  to	  a	  widespread	  sentiment	  that	  the	  Kikuyu,	  as	  a	  community,	  had	  hoarded	  the	  levers	  of	  power.	  This	  discontent	  remained	  even	  as	  the	  Kalenjin	  assumed	  power	  and	  had	  their	  own	  chance	  to	  ‘eat	  the	  national	  cake’	  under	  President	  Moi.28	  As	  the	  prospect	  of	  newly	  minted	  multiparty	  elections	  loomed	  over	  the	  1992	  presidental	  elections,	  President	  Moi	  used	  a	  call	  to	  ethnicity	  to	  remind	  the	  Kalenjin	  community	  of	  the	  stakes	  of	  losing	  the	  election.	  In	  fact,	  ‘Kalenjin’	  identity	  was	  itself	  an	  arbitrary	  construction	  by	  Moi,	  it	  was	  a	  consolidation	  of	  several	  small	  ethnic	  groups	  into	  one	  common	  community	  from	  which	  Moi	  could	  garner	  support.29	  Indeed,	  the	  minority	  at	  risk	  syndrome	  was	  certainly	  at	  play	  in	  Kenya.	  That	  “fear	  of	  domination	  by	  one	  or	  several	  ethnic	  groups…	  continued	  to	  feature	  prominently	  in	  political	  party	  politics	  in	  Kenya	  during	  the	  period	  after	  independence.”30	  When	  the	  prospect	  of	  the	  1992	  election	  drew	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Richard Ilorah, "Ethnic Bias, Favouritism and Development in Africa”, 699 
27 Mulinge Munyae, “Ethnicization of the State”, 154 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 146 
30 Ibid., 148	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closer,	  the	  Kalenjin,	  Maasai	  and	  Pokots	  violently	  mobilized	  against	  the	  Kikuyu	  in	  the	  Rift	  Valley	  and	  the	  Luo	  and	  Luhiya	  in	  western	  Kenya.31	  Thus,	  the	  violence	  was	  not	  the	  result	  of	  inter-­‐ethnic	  enmity,	  but	  of	  historical	  grievances	  that	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  when	  the	  causal	  structural	  factors	  are	  considered.	  The	  minority	  at	  risk	  syndrome	  results	  in	  the	  instrumentalization	  of	  ethnic	  cleavages	  because	  marginalized	  communities	  respond	  to	  an	  increasingly	  ethnicized	  state	  by	  creating	  ethnicized	  political	  movements	  of	  their	  own.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  institutionalization,	  ethnicity	  can	  assume	  a	  role	  of	  opposition	  that	  otherwise	  would	  have	  been	  served	  in	  the	  political	  process.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  part	  of	  the	  normal	  function	  of	  ethnicity	  and	  tribe	  is	  that	  of	  an	  imagined	  community,	  an	  understanding	  of	  mutual	  interest.	  However,	  when	  situated	  in	  a	  context	  without	  political	  institutionalization,	  ethnicity’s	  power	  of	  solidarity	  can	  be	  used	  to	  mobilize	  ethnic	  grievances.	  This	  was	  certainly	  the	  case	  in	  Nigeria.	  The	  1967-­‐1970	  Biafra	  civil	  war	  was	  the	  result	  of	  the	  political	  mobilization	  of	  the	  Igbo	  and	  Ijaw	  people	  of	  southeast	  Nigeria.32	  The	  country	  is	  split	  along	  regional	  and	  religious	  fault	  lines	  that	  overlap	  with	  ethnic	  lines.	  The	  people	  from	  the	  oil-­‐rich	  delta	  of	  Ogoniland	  “complain	  bitterly	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  marginalisation	  by	  the	  Nigerian	  Government	  despite	  their	  ancestral	  land	  being	  the	  main	  source	  of	  the	  country’s	  oil	  and	  thus	  of	  government	  revenue.”33	  This	  marginalization,	  the	  Igbo	  argue,	  is	  due	  to	  the	  control	  that	  the	  Hausa-­‐Felani	  ethnic	  group	  holds	  over	  political	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power.34	  While	  the	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  system	  was,	  in	  fact,	  utilized	  to	  contain	  the	  ethnic	  tensions	  by	  enticing	  would-­‐be	  secessionists	  with	  the	  patron-­‐client	  system,	  the	  structures	  of	  ethnicity	  and	  tribe	  hold	  significant	  connotations	  and	  the	  minority	  at	  risk	  paradigm	  and	  lack	  of	  political	  institutionalization	  are	  both	  realities	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  political	  landscape.	  	  The	  politics	  of	  personal	  rule,	  then,	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  political	  institutionalization	  that	  is	  a	  mark	  of	  political	  structures	  across	  the	  continent.	  The	  ethnicization	  of	  these	  levers	  of	  power,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  marginalization	  of	  certain	  ethnic	  and	  tribal	  communities,	  can	  create	  the	  minority	  at	  risk	  paradigm	  which	  can	  be	  mobilized	  into	  political	  opposition	  and	  conflict.	  This	  paper	  will	  now	  explore	  the	  international	  structural	  conditions	  that	  are	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  electoral	  contests	  and	  civic	  violence	  across	  Africa.	  	  	   Ethnicized	  States	  and	  Global	  Forces	  	   	  The	  causal	  factors	  of	  ethnicized	  political	  violence	  and	  electoral	  contests	  reach	  far	  beyond	  the	  nation-­‐state	  level.	  The	  international	  context	  in	  which	  these	  events	  take	  place	  shape,	  exacerbate	  and	  maintain	  conflict.	  When	  international	  factors	  are	  intermingled	  with	  the	  local	  politics	  of	  tribe	  and	  ethnicity,	  it	  can	  have	  serious	  consequences	  for	  the	  political	  structure	  of	  African	  states.	  This	  paper	  will	  now	  explore	  two	  international	  forces:	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  international	  landscape;	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  Structural	  Adjustment	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Programmes	  (SAPs)	  and	  other	  international	  interferences.	  Just	  as	  ethnicity	  and	  tribalism	  alone	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  breed	  ethnic	  conflict,	  these	  factors	  should	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  exacerbating	  factors	  –	  they	  compound	  the	  issues	  that	  this	  paper	  has	  already	  explored	  at	  the	  individual	  and	  national	  levels.	  Of	  course,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  international	  factors	  is	  one	  that	  this	  paper	  has	  already	  considered	  –	  the	  factor	  of	  colonialism.	  	   The	  zero-­‐sum	  nature	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  meant	  that	  nearly	  all	  states,	  even	  those	  previously	  deemed	  peripheral,	  were	  important	  strategic	  considerations	  in	  the	  simmering	  conflict	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  USSR.	  Third	  World	  countries	  were	  thrust	  to	  the	  center	  of	  international	  politics,	  as	  it	  was	  understood	  that	  warfare	  between	  the	  superpowers	  would	  be	  fought	  on	  proxy	  battlefields,	  rather	  than	  on	  American	  or	  Soviet	  soil.	  The	  influx	  of	  military	  aid	  that	  the	  superpowers	  provided	  to	  these	  secondary	  states	  was	  substantial	  to	  say	  the	  least	  –	  heightening	  the	  stakes	  of	  political	  office.	  ‘Friendly’	  dictatorships	  were	  supported	  across	  Africa	  and	  Asia	  to	  the	  tune	  of	  $107.3	  billion	  in	  arms	  and	  equipment	  by	  America	  alone	  between	  1950	  and	  1979.35	  However,	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  period	  and	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  meant	  that	  these	  supportive	  relationships	  were	  no	  longer	  considered	  necessary	  to	  American	  interests,	  and	  the	  money	  evaporated	  from	  the	  coffers	  of	  African	  states.36	  This	  scarcity	  heightened	  the	  internal	  competition	  for	  resources	  within	  African	  states,	  exposing	  the	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  resources	  along	  ethnic	  lines.	  It	  is	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Bethwell Ogot, “African Conflicts in a Global Context: A Research Agenda,” in Conflict in 
Contemporary Africa, ed. P. G. Okoth et al. (Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2000) 20 
36 Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006) 86	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surprising,	  then,	  that	  the	  outbreak	  of	  many	  ethnicized	  political	  conflicts	  across	  the	  continent	  occurred	  along	  the	  timeline	  as	  major	  shifts	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  The	  clan-­‐based	  civil	  war	  in	  Somalia,	  for	  example,	  	  a	  country	  considered	  particularly	  critical	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  due	  to	  its	  geography,	  began	  in	  earnest	  in	  1991	  –	  the	  same	  year	  as	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  USSR.37	  	  	   The	  Structural	  Adjustment	  Programs	  (SAPs)	  issued	  as	  a	  directive	  of	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  also	  exacerbated	  resource	  scarcity.	  Structural	  Adjustment	  sought	  to	  align	  the	  African	  states	  that	  they	  served	  with	  the	  neoliberal	  principles	  that	  they	  espoused:	  austerity,	  financial	  liberalization,	  and	  denationalization.	  The	  result	  was	  the	  dismantling	  of	  the	  fledging	  social	  welfare	  nets	  and	  social	  capital	  of	  many	  African	  states.	  SAP	  intervention	  in	  Somalia	  in	  the	  1980s	  “triggered	  the	  devaluation	  of	  the	  shilling	  by	  more	  than	  90	  per	  cent,	  brought	  further	  cutbacks	  on	  state	  employment	  and	  social	  spending,	  and	  worsened	  the	  trade	  balance.”38	  The	  foreign	  debt	  of	  many	  African	  states	  skyrocketed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  shift	  from	  foreign	  assistance	  to	  commercial	  borrowing	  in	  the	  1970s,	  ever	  reducing	  non-­‐military	  aid	  budgets.39	  40.	  In	  Somalia,	  the	  national	  debt	  approached	  of	  $1	  billion	  less	  than	  a	  decade	  before	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  civil	  war.41	  This	  sort	  of	  resource	  scarcity	  not	  only	  heightens	  competition	  for	  the	  remaining	  resources	  from	  disparate	  ethnic	  groups,	  but	  also	  challenges	  the	  ability	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ahmed Samatar, “The Somali Catastrophe: Explanations and Implications,” in Ethnicity Kills? The 
Politics of War, Peace, and Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa ed. Einar Braathen, et al. (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 2000), 58 
38 Ibid., 57 
39 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars, 85 
40 Einar Braathen, “Ethnicity Kills? Social Struggles for Power, Resources and Identities inn the Neo-
Patrimonial State”, 14 
41 Ahmed Samatar, “The Somali Catastrophe: Explanations and Implications”, 57	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neo-­‐patrimonial	  rulers	  to	  entice	  the	  loyalty	  of	  their	  clients.	  As	  the	  system	  of	  personal	  rule	  derives	  power	  from	  the	  individual	  leader,	  and	  not	  the	  office,	  the	  inability	  of	  a	  president	  to	  deliver	  clients	  is	  a	  major	  blow	  to	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  system.42	  The	  public	  coffers	  are,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  empty	  to	  both	  the	  public	  and	  to	  the	  private	  ruler	  and	  cannot	  purchase	  the	  loyalty	  or	  complacency	  of	  rival	  ethnic	  leaders.	  Thus,	  due	  to	  international	  pressures,	  the	  patron-­‐client	  system	  can	  come	  apart	  at	  the	  seams.	  	  This	  paper	  contested	  the	  notion	  that	  ethnic	  conflict	  and	  ‘tribalism’	  are	  
exclusively	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  civil	  conflicts	  and	  electoral	  contests	  in	  Africa	  by	  rebutting	  the	  primordialist	  conception	  of	  ethnicity	  and	  exploring	  the	  colonial	  origins	  of	  the	  ‘tribe’	  as	  a	  social	  cleavage.	  This	  paper	  then	  explored	  the	  interaction	  of	  ethnicity	  with	  individual	  factors	  of	  neopatrimonialism	  and	  the	  use	  of	  ethnicity	  as	  political	  currency	  by	  African	  leaders.	  At	  the	  national	  level,	  this	  paper	  recognized	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  institutionalization	  and	  the	  minority	  at	  risk	  syndrome,	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  mobilization	  of	  forces	  along	  ethnic	  lines.	  This	  paper	  recognized	  the	  international	  factors	  to	  be	  the	  impact	  of	  Cold	  War	  and	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  paradigms	  as	  well	  as	  Structural	  Adjustment	  Programs.	  Essentialist	  claims	  about	  the	  heart	  of	  African	  civil	  conflicts	  and	  electoral	  violence	  urge	  you	  to	  “leave	  all	  reason	  at	  the	  door	  before	  you	  enter	  the	  chamber	  of	  African	  conflicts.”	  However,	  this	  paper	  showed	  that	  what	  truly	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  African	  ethnic	  civil	  conflicts	  and	  electoral	  contests	  is	  not	  simple	  tribalism,	  but	  a	  complex	  interplay	  of	  historical,	  social	  and	  political	  factors.	  As	  when	  speaking	  about	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Einar Braathen, “Ethnicity Kills? Social Struggles for Power, Resources and Identities inn the Neo-
Patrimonial State”, 14 
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any	  complex	  topic,	  and	  particularly	  when	  explaining	  the	  reasons	  that	  groups	  commit	  acts	  violence	  against	  one	  another,	  selecting	  a	  monocausal	  explanation	  such	  as	  the	  ‘tribe’	  is	  woefully	  insufficient.	  Established	  kinship	  systems	  do	  indeed	  have	  an	  impact	  upon	  African	  politics,	  just	  as	  they	  do	  the	  world	  over.	  To	  ignore	  the	  structural	  factors	  effectively	  dispossesses	  ordinary	  Africans	  from	  their	  agency	  –	  ordinary	  Africans	  who	  may	  or	  may	  not	  claim	  tribal	  affiliations.	  This	  argument	  says	  that	  that	  the	  individual	  Somali,	  Nigerian	  or	  Kenyan	  is	  simply	  swept	  along	  with	  the	  tide	  of	  historical	  animus,	  acting	  from	  an	  irrational	  inter-­‐tribal	  hatred	  that	  extends	  perpetually	  backward	  and	  inevitably	  forward	  into	  time.	  In	  reality,	  individuals	  respond	  to	  current	  conditions	  with	  a	  mind	  to	  historical	  precedents,	  they	  act.	  Only	  once	  this	  fact	  is	  considered	  in	  contemporary	  discourse	  can	  we	  truly	  begin	  to	  analyze	  the	  role	  of	  kinship	  ties	  in	  African	  political	  conflict.	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